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Patterns of
Supreme Court
reliance in the
Burger and
Rehnquist eras

Reliance on legislative history in the Court's majority
opinions has fallen from nearly 50 percent during
the Burger era to less than 30 percent since 1985.
by JAMES J. BRUDNEY AND COREY DITSLEAR

T

legislative history to help explain and justify its
he Unitedhas
States
Supreme
Court's
reliance
on
decisions
declined
sharply
over the
past two
decades. Both federal judges and academics regularly disagree on whether courts should consult the record of legislative hearings, committee reports, and floor exchanges
that accompanies a congressional enactment.' In the
midst of this spirited debate, the Rehnquist Court
embarked on a substantial departure from past practice.
An examination of some 650 majority opinions in the
area of workplace law reveals that reliance on legislative
220

history has fallen from nearly 50 percent during the
Burger era to less than 30 percent since 1985.
The Court's receding faith in legislative history is often
attributed to the influence ofJustice Antonin Scalia, who
has consistently criticized use of this resource as an aid to
1. For disagreement among Supreme Court justices, see Stephen Breyer,
85-101 (New
York: Random House, 2005); Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of LegislativeHistory
in InterpretingStatutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); Antonin Scalia, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 29-37 (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 1997).
ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION
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interpretation. Although Justice
Scalia's role has surely been important, what about the contribution of
other justices, who author some
eight-ninths of the Court's decisions?
Does the Court's diminished
appetite for legislative history extend
equally to all subject matter areas
within a given field of law? Further,
in a doctrinal field where federal
statutes are consistently liberal or
redistributive in orientation, does
the Court rely on legislative history
more often to support liberal results
than conservative outcomes? Finally,
is there an ideological "tilt" associated with legislative history reliance
by liberal or conservative justices?
Focus on these questions helps
explain why the Rehnquist Court
curtailed the use of legislative history
as part of its reasoning process.
There has been a recent upsurge of
interest among legal and social science scholars in analyzing judicial
reasoning from an empirical perspective.' Examining how the justices
use legislative history to support
their decisions offers insights for
lower courts and attorneys as they
consider legislative history arguments in future cases. In addition,

assessing the Court's principled justifications for its holdings sheds light
on the persuasiveness of judicial
decision making; this in turn influences perceptions about the legitimacy of courts in general.
The dataset for this study consists
of every United States Supreme
Court decision involving the law of
the workplace from the start of the
Burger Court in 1969 through the
end of the Rehnquist Court in 2005.
This broad category encompasses
649 decisions-primarily statutory
constitutional-that
but
also
address union-management relations, employment discrimination,
safety and health, minimum wage
and overtime standards, retirement
benefits, employee privacy and freedom of expression, and even the
immigration or tax consequences of
individuals' status and conditions
while on the job. Within the workplace law field we have identified
eight distinct subject matter categories: seven covering claims that
statutory
to different
relate
schemes, and the eighth covering
decisions that apply provisions of
the Constitution. Measured in
three-year intervals, workplace law

2. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et. al., Judging Statutes:
Thoughts on Statutory Interpretation and Notes for a
Project on the InternalRevenue Code, 13 WASH. U.J.L.
& PoL'y 305 (2003); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey
A. Segal, An OriginalLook at Originalism,36 LAw &
Soc'y REv. 113 (2002); Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalismin Recent Supreme
Court Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative
History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. RiV. 1
(1998); Gregory C. Sisk et. al., Charting the Influences on theJudicialMind: An EmpiricalStudy ofJudicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1377, 1434-50,
1493-98 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,
398 U.S. 375, 397 (1970) (relying on committee
reports to clarify inconclusive text); Webb v.
Board of Educ., 471 U.S. 234, 241 n.16 (1985)
(relying on committee reports to reinforce apparent meaning of text.
4. Other scholars analyzing the Court's use of

legislative history have focused on the number of
times such history is cited in the justices' opinions.
See Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S.
Supreme Court and the Use ofLegislative Histories:A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 297-98
(1982); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court'iDecliningReliance en Legislative History: The Impact ofJustice
Scalia's Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGiS. 369, 384-85
(1999). We distinguish between interpretive
resources that are merely referenced or discussed
but not relied on, and resources that are affirmatively relied on as a probative or determining factor
to support the majority's reasoning process. In this
regard, when the majority invokes a resource (such
as legislative history or a language canon) in order
to dismiss the value ascribed to it by a litigant, a
lower court, or a dissenting justice, we do not consider that affirmative reliance: the majority has
"deflected" the resource rather than using it as an
asset to justify or buttress the Court's holding.

cases have formed a remarkably stable portion of the Court's docket
since the mid 1970s, about one-sixth
of all merits decisions.
Methods
The purpose of the research
reported here is to explore the
Court's reasoning techniques, specifically reliance on various interpretive
resources to help the majority reach
its result. Legislative history is one
such resource for the Court. The
Court makes use of committee
reports, floor debates, hearings, or
other legislative record evidence that
it finds indicative of the legislative
intent underlying the text that is subject to dispute. For instance, the
Court may refer explicitly to a committee report discussion to clarify the
meaning of inconclusive statutory
language, or to reinforce that such
language was intended to apply in a
certain way.'
Apart from legislative history, we
have coded for nine other interpretive resources on which the justices
rely with some frequency. These are:
(1) the plain or ordinary meaning of
textual language; (2) dictionaries;
(3) language canons; (4) legislative
purpose; (5) legislative inaction; (6)
Supreme Court precedent; (7) common law precedent; (8) substantive
canons; and (9) agency deference.
The Court's opinions almost always
identify at least two interpretive
resources as probative of its decision,
and the vast majority recognize three
or more. Identifying a resource's
probative role in the majority's affirmative reasoning process casts a
sharper light on the Court's justifications for its decisions.4
The relationship between the
Court's use of interpretive resources
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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and the ideological direction of its
opinions is also explored. Accordingly, all 649 workplace cases are
classified according to whether the
Court's legal outcome favored
employees (liberal) or employers
(conservative). In addition, each of
the 19 justices who served during
this time is identified as either liberal or conservative, relying on voting scores derived from the Spaeth
Supreme Court database.5
Declining reliance
As noted at the outset and in Figure
1, the Court's interest in legislative
history has declined sharply over
time. Court reliance for the entire
36 year period stands at 38 percent,
but the level of reliance has fallen
between the Burger and Rehnquist
eras from 47 percent to 29 percent, a
statistically significant decrease. This
downward trend becomes even
sharper when constitutional decisions, which not surprisingly feature
very little reliance on legislative history, are excluded. Omitting decisions on constitutional matters, the
Court's reliance on legislative history
declined from 51 percent during the
Burger years to 29 percent in the
Rehnquist era.
As Figure 1 indicates, the turning
point in the Court's appetite for legislative history as a reasoning asset
came in the late 1980s and early
1990s. Reliance declined from 50
percent in the 1986 term to 33 percent during the following three
terms (1987-89) and to 17 percent
for the 1990-92 terms. Legislative history usage then leveled off at 23 percent for almost a decade before
rebounding in the last three terms to
37 percent. While the 2002 and 2003
terms featured Court reliance at 43
percent, the 2004 term level was only
17 percent; more time is needed to
determine if the two preceding
terms were anomalies rather than
the start of a long-term resurgence.
Individual justices
Authoring an opinion for the Court
is hardly an exercise in judicial independence. Justices face a number of
constraints when writing for four or
222

Figure 1. Legislative history reliance
over time
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more colleagues. Opinion assignments may reflect case-specific considerations, including the need to
solidify a fragile majority or the
desire to utilize an individual justice's
expertise on a particular issue, as well
as broader institutional factors such
as a preference for equalizing workload. In addition, the contours of a
Court opinion will likely be shaped to
some extent by the contentions of
the litigants. Still, the justices retain
ample discretion when explaining
and defending the results reached,
provided they are able to retain at
least four other votes.
Table 1 reports justices' reliance
on legislative history in their majority
opinions, listing total number of
majority opinions in parenthesis for
each of the 16 justices who served
between 1969 and 2005 and who
authored at least 10 majority opinions.7 Forjustices whose tenure spans

both the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, reliance is reported separately for each period, again listing
the number of majority opinions in
parenthesis.
The most striking feature of the
variations among individual justices
is the record of Justices Scalia and
Clarence Thomas. Justice Scalia has
long proclaimed his distrust of legislative history as a resource, andJustice Thomas has followed his lead.9
Scalia's appointment to ChiefJustice
Warren Burger's seat in 1986, and
Thomas's arrival as a replacement
for Justice Thurgood Marshall in
1992, together account for a large
part of the Court's diminished willingness to rely on legislative history.
Nearly one-half of the Court's
decline in legislative history reliance
since 1986 is attributable to the opinion-writing performances of Justices
Scalia and Thomas.1 Justice Anthony

5. We obtained ideology scores for the justices
individually based on their votes through the 19992000 term on a range of Spaeth database issue
codes that included civil rights, union-related, and
selected economic issues, Harold J. Spaeth, THE

nine); Harlan in 50% (two of four), and Black in
75% (three of four). We omit them from this table
based on their minimal levels of participation,
which in turn reflect brief periods of service on the
Burger Court. In 22 of the 649 cases in our dataset,
the Court delivered its holding and principal reasoning in a plurality opinion. We treat these plurality opinions as majorities for purposes of our
analyses.
8. See, e.g., Scalia's concurring opinion as a
member of the D.C. Circuit in Hirschey v. FERC,
777 F.2d 1, 7-8 (1985); see also Scalia, supra n. 1, at
29-37; Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597, 616-23 (1991) (Scalia,J., concurring).
9. See, e.g., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510
U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia and Thomas,MJ., concurring); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170,
172 n.1 (1993) (reflecting views ofJJ. Scalia and
Thomas).

ORIGINAL U.S. SUPREME COURT JUDIcAL DATABASE

1953-2003 Terms, http://www.as.uky.edu/poliisci/ulmerproject/sctdata.htm. For a more
detailed discussion of how we assembled our database, see James J. Brudney and Corey Ditslear,
Canons of Construction and the Elusive Questfor Neutral Reasoning,58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 15-29 (2005).
6. We designate results as significant at the .05
level (t < .05). All statistical analyses in this article
are run using Stata version 7.
7. Justice Douglas authored nine majority opinions during this period;Justices Black and Harlan
authored four each. Douglas relied on legislative
history in 44% of his Court opinions (four of
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Table 1: Legislative history reliance by
justices authoring 10 or more
majority opinions

Justice
Marshall
Burger
Brennan
Stewart
Blackmun
White
Souter
Stevens
Ginsburg
O'Connor
Breyer
Powell
Rehnquist
Kennedy
Scalia
Thomas

Legislative
history %
All years

Legislative
history %
Burger years

60*
59
55*
52
46

(53)
(17)
(69)
(33)
(48)

65
59
54
52

(37)
(17)
(54)
(33)

44

(66)

44
40

(23)
(63)

36

(14)

31
29
28
26*
23*

(48)
(14)
(36)
(47)
(26)

4*
0*

(28)
(24)

53 (49)
N/A
48 (29)
N/A
40 (5)
N/A
24 (33)
22 (32)
N/A
N/A
N/A

46 (28)

Legislative
history %
Rehnquist years
50 (16)
N/A
60 (15)
N/A
45 (20)
18 (17)
44 (23)
32 (34)
36 (14)
30 (43)
29 (14)
67 (3)
33 (15)
23 (26)
4 (28)
0 (24)

* t-test reveals significant difference between that justice's reliance and reliance in decisions authored by all other
justices. Overall mean for legislative history reliance is 38%.
Number of majority opinions for each justice in parenthesis.

Kennedy, another Rehnquist era
appointee, also has been a notably
infrequent user of legislative history
in his majority opinions, and he too
has expressed skepticism regarding
its reliability in general.11
In addition, Table 1 reveals interesting differences in legislative history reliance among the six justices
who contributed at least 10 majority
opinions during both the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts. Justice Byron
White relied far less frequently on
legislative history in his Rehnquist

era majority opinions than he had
during the Burger years; Justice John
Paul Stevens' and Justice Marshall's

10. We determined that there has been a
decline of 17.36% in legislative history reliance
(from 46.12 to 28.76) when comparing majority
opinions by Justice Burger (who served until the
start of the Rehnquist era) plus the Burger era
majorities authored by the eight "continuing
Justices" (who served for part or all of the Rehnquist years) as against all majorities written during the Rehnquist era. Majorities written by
Justices Scalia and Thomas (when appropriately
weighted based on their proportional contribution to the Rehnquist era total of 299 decisions)
constitute 7.99% out of 17.36%, or 46.0% of the
decline.
11. See, e.g., Public Employees Retirement System v. Betts, 491 U.S. 158, 168 (1989); Public Citizen v. United States Dept. ofJustice, 491 U.S. 440,

470-73 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
12. Of the three other justices who made substantial workplace law contributions in both eras,
Justice Blackmun's use of legislative history
remained constant while Justices Brennan and
Rehnquist actually increased their reliance on legislative history after 1985. Justice Rehnquist, however, was an infrequent user of legislative history
overall, even with the heightened reliance that
followed his elevation to chief justice.
13. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511,
518 n.12 (1993) (Justice Stevens for Court majority); United States v. Thompson/Center Arms
Co., 504 U.S. 505, 516 n.8 (1992) (JusticeSouter
for Court majority); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v.
Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 n.4 (1991) (Justice
White for Court majority).

justice Antonin Ncalia
has long proclaimed his
distrust of legislative
history as a resource.

Justice John Paul
Stevens' reliance on
legislative history in
majority opinions
noticeably declined
during the Rehnquist
Court years.

reliance on legislative history also
declined noticeably during their
years on the Rehnquist Court. Taking these three justices together,
reliance on legislative history
declined from 56 percent (64 of 115
majority opinions) to 33 percent (22
of 67 majority opinions), a signifi1t
cant decrease.
Justice Scalia's commitment to
avoiding reliance on legislative history may have exerted an important
ripple effect. During Scalia's early
years on the Court, several justices
took issue with his openly expressed
hostility toward legislative history.13
Two of those colleagues, howeverJustices White and Stevens-made
considerably less use of such history
in opinions they authored after 1985.
Further, Justice Stephen Breyer, who
vigorously defended the uses of legislative history while an appellate
court judge, has relied on that
resource less often than Justice Harry
Blackmun, whom he replaced,
although Breyer's volume of workwww.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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place law decisions is not yet very
large.
These three justices, and perhaps
others as well, may have come to
regard analysis based on legislative
history as less important in explaining or justifying a result.14 The Rehnquist Court as a whole relied more
often than its Burger era counterpart on a linguistic approach tojudicial reasoning, focused on text,
dictionaries, and language canons,
and less often on the primary intentionalist resources of legislative history and purpose. Faced with the
outspoken position adopted by Justice Scalia and later Justice Thomas,
other justices may have concluded,
even if subconsciously, that relying
regularly on legislative history risked
diminishing the prospects of attracting or retaining the allegiance of
their colleagues. In this regard,
roughly one-third of the Court's
reduced reliance on legislative history appears to be attributable to
changes in the opinion-writing of the
eight "continuing justices"-those
who served in both the Burger and
Rehnquist eras.15

Subject matter areas
The decline in legislative history
usage may be linked not only to
changes in the Court's membership
but also to the varied subject matter
composition of workplace law. Congress's regulatory initiatives in some
areas are more recently promulgated
than in others; there also may be differences in the volume or detail of
legislative history materials that
accompany a given statutory scheme.
Table 2 identifies two subject matter categories that are associated
with unusually high Court reliance
on legislative history. Majority opinions interpreting race or sex discrimination statutes and opinions
applying minimum standards laws
made significantly more use of legislative history compared with the
baseline rate of reliance. In addition, two subject matter areas-general negligence
statutes and
constitutional decisions-are associated with unusually low Court
reliance on legislative history.
224

Table 2: Legislative history reliance by
subject matter category

Issue

Legislative
history %
All years

Legislative
history %
Burger years

Legislative
history %
Rehnquist years

33
47*
41
54*
45
9*
44
10*

39
56
87
70
60
25
50
9

19 #
33 #
23 #
40 #
40
5
39
11

Labor relations (192)
Race or sex discr. (138)
General discr. (54)
Min. standards (71)
Retirement (62)
General negligence (23)
Misc. (46)
Constitutional (134)

* t-test reveals significant difference in reliance for all years between that issue area and all other issue areas.
# t-test reveals significant difference in reliance for that issue area between the Burger and Rehnquist Courts.

Table 2 also indicates the decline
in Court reliance is most pronounced in four subject matter
areas. For statutory decisions
addressing labor relations, race or
sex discrimination, general discrimination (primarily age in this
dataset), and minimum standards,
the Court's use of legislative history
has declined significantly from the
Burger to the Rehnquist years.
The latter three of these four areas
are dominated by federal laws
enacted either just prior to 1969 or
early in the Burger Court era." For
statutes enacted in the 1960s and

1970s, legislative history may have
been deemed especially valuable in
the initial round of Court decisions,
as the justices grappled for the first
time with discerning congressional
intent. With regard to Title VII, for
example, the Court had to address
contentious disputes involving the
often inconclusive text Congress
approved in 1964. In its first generation of Title VII decisions, the justices relied heavily on legislative
history to help explain inter alia the
scope of the Court's remedial
authority under the Act, the federal
government's ability to seek class-

14. There is another possible explanation for
this downturn: strategic choices made by
Supreme Court advocates may be influencing the
justices' willingness to rely on legislative history.
Given the steadfast hostility expressed by two justices, litigants before the Court may have concluded they should reduce reliance on the
legislative history resource when presenting their
legal positions. We explored this hypothesis on a
preliminary basis by reviewing the parties' merits
briefs for all workplace law cases decided in two
terms at the end of the Burger era (1984 and
1985) when the Court's legislative history reliance
was quite high, and two terms in the middle of the
Rehnquist era (1992 and 1997) when the Court's
legislative history reliance was extraordinarily low.
We found no evidence that the litigants in these
four terms became more reluctant to advance legislative history as a resource that might justify a
Court decision, even in cases where the Court's
opinion reflects no reliance on legislative history.
We also reviewed the tables of contents for these
merits briefs to see whether the parties used the
words "legislative history" as part of a separate
argument heading or subheading. Here too, we
found the parties appear at least as willing to feature legislative history as a distinct argument in
the 1990s as they had been in the mid 1980s.
Whether Supreme Court litigants have gradually

come to rely less prominenty or less often on legislative history arguments in recent years would
require more in-depth study, especially given the
Court's own increased reliance in two of the past
three terms.
15. The exact figures are 5.62 out of 17.36, or
32.4% of the decline; seenote 10, supra,for related
discussion. The remaining one-fifth of the Court's
diminished reliance (3.75 out of 17.36, or 21.6%
of the decline) is associated with the opinion writing of newcomer justices other than Scalia and
Thomas: Justice Kennedy (who replaced Powell),
Justice Breyer (who replaced Blackmun), Justice
Souter (who replaced Brennan), andJustice Ginsburg (who replaced White).
16. Over three-fourths of all race and sex discrimination decisions involve interpretation of
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. With respect
to general discrimination, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967 accounts for more
than two-fifths of all decisions-more than twice
the number arising under any other statutory
scheme that addresses discrimination beyond
race or sex. In the minimum standards area, over
three-fourths of the Court's decisions construe
one of four statutory schemes initially enacted or
substantially amended between 1966 and 1977,
and dealing with worker safety and health or basic
compensation and overtime standards.
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wide relief, and the legality of affirmative action.17
As a statute matures and its original legislative history fades further
into the past, the Court may come to
view the detailed pre-enactment
record as less relevant, in part
because new sources of authority
have arisen to clarify the meaning of
the enacted text. For Title VII decisions, one such source is Supreme
Court precedent: the Court's own
intervening interpretations may create a baseline understanding of certain provisions or concepts. Thus, for
example, in a 1987 case challenging
an affirmative action preference for
female applicants, the Court relied
heavily on the holding and analysis
from its seminal 1979 decision to

may effectively diminish reliance on
a gradually aging legislative history
record is agency deference, whereby
the intervening construction of a
textual provision by the agency
charged with enforcement is then
endorsed by the Court."
The notion that the Court may
find legislative history less helpful as
a statute ages is supported by examination of the labor relations category. The National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) dominates this subject
area with over four-fifths of all decisions. The NLRA was enacted in
1935 and had its last major revision
in 1959. Although there is a rich legislative record accompanying the
1935, 1947, and 1959 enactments,
the Court's reliance on legislative

As a statute's original legislative
history fades into the past, the
Court may come to view the
detailed pre-enactment record
as less relevant.
delineate further the lawful contours
of affirmative action."i Similarly, the
Court has relied on precedent in the
area of sexual harassment law to
refine the scope of employer liability
for discriminatory harassment by
supervisors. 9 Another source that

history when interpreting labor relations statutes during the Burger era
was below the baseline level of
reliance for that 17-year period.
Importantly, the Burger Court's
reliance on legislative history when
interpreting the NLRA was signifi-

17. See Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 758-66
(1976); General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318,
325-29 (1980); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 201-08 (1979).
18. SeeJohnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,
627-40 (1987). As was true for race or sex discrimination cases in general, the Court's use of
legislative history in Title VII decisions declined
significantly between the Burger and Rehnquist
years, from 52% to 31%.
19. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S.

earlier decades. See Beth Henschen, Judicial Use of
Legislative History and Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 10 LEGIS. STUDIES Q. 353, 360-65 (1985).
Using a different methodology, Henschen analyzed all 124 NLRA cases decided by the Court
between 1950 and 1972.
22. See, e.g., ABF Freight Systems v. NLRB, 510
U.S. 317, 322-25 (1994); NLRB v. Curtin-Matheson, 494 U.S. 775, 786-96 (1990); Fall River Dyeing Co. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 36-53 (1987);
Lechmere v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527, 534-40 (1992)
(Supreme Court precedent only).
23. In the Burger era, there are 3.94 resources
per decision when legislative history is relied on and
2.5 resources per decision when legislative history is
not a factor. The corresponding figures for Rehnquist era decisions are 4.50 and 2.88. Given that our
coding approach allows for up to ten resources per
majority opinion (nine in opinions without legislative history), one also could describe the reduction
in resources used as roughly 12% when comparing
majorities relying on legislative history with majorities having no such reliance: 39% v. 28% in the
Burger era, and 45% v. 32% in the Rehnquist years.

775, 786-88, 804-07 (1998).
20. See, e.g., Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 45762 (1997) (applying Fair Labor Standards Act);
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Schwalb, 493 U.S. 40,
47-48 (1989) (applying Longshore and Harbor
Workers Compensation Act); Mullins Coal v.
Director, Office of Workers Comp., 484 U.S. 135,
159-60 (1987) (applying Black Lung Act).
21. Our dataset does not extend back to the
1950s and 1960s, when key provisions of the
NLRA had just been enacted, but a previous study
suggests that the Court found NLRA legislative
history more reliable as a resource during those

canly lower than its reliance on this
resource when construing three
major statutes from other subject
matter areas, all initially enacted
between 1964 and 1974. The three
major statutory schemes include
Title VII (1964), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
(1967), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
(1974). Legislative history reliance
during the Burger years was 52 percent for 65 Title VII decisions, 100
percent for eight ADEA decisions, 60
percent for 10 ERISA decisions, and
2 1

33 percent for 83 NLRA decisions.

Further, while the principal laws in
the labor relations category were
more than two decades old at the
start of the Burger Court era, they
were at least half a century old by the
late 1990s. The justices evidently
found legislative history even less useful as guidance when resolving labor
relations controversies several generations removed from Congress's preenactment deliberative processes
rather than merely one or two. The
significant decline in reliance within
this category from the Burger to the
Rehnquist years may again reflect the
influence of intervening authorityboth Supreme Court precedent and
deference to agency determinations.

22

Interestingly, the Court's declining
reliance on legislative history seems
to be more a matter of attrition than
substitution. The Rehnquist Court
uses a slightly higher number of
interpretive resources per decision
than did the Burger Court. The difference reflects a significant increase
in Rehnquist era reliance on textual
meaning, dictionaries, canons of
construction, and common law
precedent that more than offsets the
Court's diminished use of legislative
history. Yet when legislative history is
not used, the number of resources
per decision actually declines by
more than one in both Burger and
Rehnquist Court majority opinions."
The justices apparently have concluded that while legislative history
can help to explain and justify a
result, its absence does not leave a
gap that needs to be filled.
www.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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Whether subject matter variations
are as influential as the justices' individual roles authoring majority opinions is an area that warrants more
nuanced examination. The record
regarding the 1990 Americans with
Disabilities Act-construed by the
Court in 12 majority opinions, only
two of which rely on its extensive legislative history-suggests that the
"statutory
aging"
hypothesis
advanced for some federal laws is not
applicable
across the
board.
Nonetheless, it does seem that the
relative maturity of a statutory
scheme influences the Court's
changing patterns of legislative history reliance.
Ideological direction
Table 1 discloses that four of the five
most conservative members of the
Rehnquist Court are at best reluctant
users of legislative history, while two
of the most liberal justices who
served during the
combined
period-Justices William Brennan
and Marshall-regard legislative history with special favor. This raises the
possibility that legislative history
reliance during our 36-year time
span has a distinctly liberal or proemployee tilt. Such an inference is at
least plausible given that Congress in
the workplace law area has consistently acted to further a broad proemployee intent. Statutes approved
from the 1930s to the early 1990s
have had as their basic purpose to
augment the legal protections available to employees and thereby promote
economic
security and
individual dignity in the American
workplace.
In fact, however, legislative history
findings for the Court as a whole do
not support a liberal or pro-employee
tilt. Sorting the Court's entire body of
decisions according to ideological
direction reveals that legislative history reliance is fairly evenly distributed. It is used to help explain 40
percent of the 310 decisions that
reach a liberal or pro-employee
result, 37 percent of the 291 decisions
that arrive at a conservative or proemployer outcome, and 35 percent of
the 48 indeterminate ideology deci226

Table 3: Outcomes associated with
legislative history reliance by
selected justices

Leg. history
reliance %

Liberal justices
Liberal
Conservative
decision
decision
46(205)
50(117)

Conservative justices
Liberal
Conservative
decision
decision
15(53)

22 (112)

Total number of majority opinions for each outcome in parenthesis.

Justices William Brennan
and Thurgood Marshall
regard legislative history
with special favor. This
raises the possibility
that legislative history
reliance during our 36year time span has a
distinctly liberal tilt.

sions (favoring neither employees
nor employers in clear terms). The
difference between legislative history's contribution to outcomes that
favor employees as opposed to
employers is not significant.
With respect to the 249 decisions
out of 649 that rely on legislative history, 50 percent reach liberal results,
43 percent have conservative outcomes, and 7 percent are indeterminate. The distribution is slightly
more favorable to employees than
the ratios for the 400 decisions that
do not rely on legislative history, but
again the difference is not significant. Looking at all 649 decisions, 48
percent reach liberal results, 45 percent have conservative outcomes,
and 7 percent are indeterminate.

Ideology of the justices
Even though legislative history
reliance by the Court as a whole is
not associated with a distinctly liberal
or conservative direction, it remains
possible that the use of this resource
is ideologically linked in the hands of
certain conservative or liberal jus-

JUDICATURE Volume 89, Number 4 January-February 2006
HeinOnline -- 89 Judicature 226 2005-2006

tices. To consider that possibility, the
study assessed legislative history
usage for two ideologically identifiable subgroups: the five most conservative members of the Rehnquist
Court (justices William Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas, Kennedy, and Sandra Day O'Connor) and the eight
most liberal justices who served for at
least 10 years on the Rehnquist or
Burger Courts (Justices Marshall,
Brennan, Stevens, David Souter,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Breyer, Blackmun, and White).24

Table 3 shows that liberal justices
are basically outcome-neutral in
their pattern of reliance on legislative history, although conservative
justices are less so. Predictably in
light of their overall voting patterns,
liberal justices author far more

24. Voting scores reflect the percentages of
cases in which a justice casts votes favoring the
legal position of individuals, employees, or unions
on civil rights, union-related, and economic issues
coded by Professor Spaeth (seenote 5, supra). The
Spaeth issue code scores for the five conservative
justices range from 28% (Thomas) to 46%
(O'Connor); scores for the eight liberal justices
range from 81% (Marshall) to 60% (White).

Table 4: Comparing outcomes: decisions relying on legislative
history versus decisions not relying on legislative history*
Liberal justices

Liberal
decision
% decisions relying on LH
% decisions not relying on LH

57
60

Conservative
decision
35
32

Total #
decisions
(165)
(185)

Conservative justices
Libera I
Conservative
Total #
decision
decisio n
cdecisions
24
32

74
63

(34)
(139)

* Percentages do not add up to 100 because the total number of decisions for both liberal and conservative justices includes cases with indeterminate ideology that are not
reported here.

majority opinions reaching proemployee results (205 versus 117)
while conservative justices write
more majority opinions favoring
employers (112 to 53). Further,
when authoring majority opinions
that reach either pro-employee or
pro-employer results, the eight liberals use legislative history more than
twice as often as the Rehnquist Court
conservatives (46-50 percent versus
15-22 percent). This too is understandable, given that four Rehnquist
Court conservatives are the four lowest users of legislative history among
all the justices, and two of the liberals-Justices Brennan and Marshall-are at the very high end
relative to their colleagues.
More surprising, however, is that
for both wings of the Court legislative history usage points in the same
ideological direction-away from the
pro-employee purposes of the statutes them-

selves. For liberal justices, legislative
history reliance is associated with a
slight moderating tendency: liberals
use legislative history to support proemployer results somewhat more
often than pro-employee outcomes.
Conservative justices also rely on legislative history to justify proemployer results more often than
pro-employee outcomes: that tendency is more predictable, given
conservatives' ideological orientation on workplace law issues. These
differences are not significant for
either subgroup of justices. Still, the
fact that legislative history reliance
for basically liberal workplace
statutes even tilts in such a proemployer direction is intriguing.

The pro-employer tendency is
more pronounced when comparing
outcomes for the two sets of justices
in decisions that rely on legislative
history versus decisions that do not.
As Table 4 indicates, decisions
authored by the eight liberal justices
that rely on legislative history reach
liberal outcomes 22 percent more
often than they produce conservative results. By contrast, the liberal
justices reach liberal outcomes 28
percent more often than conservative results in decisions without legislative history. The results for our
five conservative justices point distinctly in a pro-employer direction;
although the number of decisions is
smaller, the results are significant.
The conservative justices reach conservative results 50 percent more
often than liberal results when relying on legislative history, but only 31
percent more often when not relying
on legislative history.
For Justices Brennan and Marshall, the same moderating association is present that was observed for
the liberal justices as a group: their
majority opinions using legislative
history were more supportive of
employers than their majority opinions that did not rely on this
resource. In Justice Brennan's case,
majority opinions relying on legislative history were 16 percent conservative and 71 percent liberal; those
not relying on legislative history were
13 percent conservative and 81 percent liberal. ForJustice Marshall, the
ratios were 25 percent conservative
and 66 percent liberal in majority
opinions relying on legislative his-

tory, but 19 percent conservative and
71 percent liberal in majority opinions not relying on legislative history.
Why is legislative history reliance
associated with a slight moderating
trend for the liberal wing of the
Court? More broadly, how does legislative history accompanying liberal
pro-employee statutes end up being
relied on to support conservative
pro-employer outcomes almost half
the time?

Exploring answers
There are several observations worth
making when exploring possible
answers to these questions. Initially,
the fact that workplace law statutes
enacted by Congress favor legal
interests of employees does not
mean the enacted provisions or
accompanying legislative records are
monolithic. Complex and comprehensive legislative schemes such as
Title VII, ERISA, and the NLRA
inevitably involve compromises
among competing interests. Negotiation of various tradeoffs and adjustments is reflected in the work
product of authorizing committees
and the floor debates in both houses
of Congress. Legislators understand
they are voting for employee rights
and protections in some overarching
sense, but they also know those
rights and protections are being reconciled with the need to maintain
business operations in an efficient
and not unduly burdensome manner.
Congress regularly accommodates
such major and minor legislative
objectives in order to further its polwww.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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icy-making agenda. In this context,
there are several principled or
coherent ways that legislative history
may be used to defend conservative
or pro-employer results even as the
Court applies the terms of a liberal
or pro-employee statute. Three such
classifications occur with some frequency in the workplace law area;
they are relied on by liberal justices,
notjust conservative ones.
First, there is legislative history
that explains employer defenses or

exemptions included in the statutory
language. In a considerable number
of cases, the Court has used legislative history to confirm or establish
that Congress intended employers to
be immune from liability for certain
business judgments, even if those
judgments in some sense aggravate
the discriminatory conditions at
25

which the law is aimed.

Second, the Court has looked to
legislative history that establishes a
compromise occurred between supporters
and opponents on the issue in question.

The existence of this compromise is
manifested in the legislative record,
either through evidence of a concrete give and take between members from both sides or through
evidence that Congress simply
"agreed to disagree" on the issue,
inviting the courts to make the call. 6
Finally, the Court has invoked legislative history to demonstrate that
employees and their supporters have overreached in their claims. Typically, the

Court analyzes this legislative history
to establish that the asserted right,
protection, or remedy simply was not
envisioned by the Congress that
enacted the language under dispute."
Apart from these three doctrinal
factors, the justices may have strategic reasons for using a liberal
statute's legislative history to support
conservative results. Justices authoring majority opinions may turn to
legislative history primarily to counteract legislative history arguments
offered in dissent. Over 40 percent
of the Court's decisions relying on
this resource also feature a dissenting opinion urging that legislative
history justifies the opposite conclu228

sion. More than half of these "dueling legislative history" cases (53 out
of 101) involve conservative results:
the majority uses legislative history to
help defend its pro-employer outcome while the dissent contends that
the legislative record supports the
employee's position. In some cases,
the majority author may have added
legislative history discussion in
response to-or in anticipation ofthe dissent's argument based on evidence of Congress's intent.
To be sure, the presence of competing legislative history arguments
may reflect a dissent's response to the
majority's initiative rather than a
majority author's strategic afterthought or preemptive strike. Moreover, even when the justices invoke
legislative history in a majority opinion to further such strategic ends, the
majority author presumably has some
principled or coherent grounds for
maintaining that the history invoked
actually supports the Court's legal
conclusion. If this were not true, the
majority would likely ignore the legislative history resource altogether, or
else maintain that it is not relevant to
resolving the controversy at hand."s
It is important to examine further
this provisional determination that
deliberative materials accompanying
a statute aimed broadly in one ideological direction are being used in
coherent ways to defend specific
results pointing in the opposite
25. See,e.g., Albertson's Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527
U.S. 555, 573-74 (1999) ( Souter,J.); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 243-45 (1989)
(Brennan, J.); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 98-100 (1983) (Blackmun,J.).
26. See,e.g., Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511
U.S. 244, 250-63 (1994) (Stevens, J.); Jackson
Transit Authority v. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 24-28 (1982)
(Blackmun, J.); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S.
807, 818-24 (1980) ( Stevens, J.).
27. See,e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Hardison,
432 U.S. 63, 71-72, 81 (1977) (White,J.); Espinoza
v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1973) (Marshall, J.); Allied Chem. & Alkali Workers v. Pittsbutgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 166-68 (1971)
(Brennan, J.).
28. There are 57 decisions in which the dissent
relies on legislative history and the majority does
not. Some of these decisions that reach conservative results appear to reflect an ideologicallylinked determination to reject legislative history
evidence as irrelevant. See,e.g., Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001); Sutton v.
United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471 (1999); EEOC v.
Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
29. Although we found that legislative history
reliance was basically neutral in outcome terms,
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direction. Legislative history has
been criticized as too easily manipulated based on its subjective and
political character. The findings here
indicate, however, that the relatively
neutral aspects of legislative history
reliance, especially by liberal justices,
may be explained at least in part
based on certain recurrent and principled judicial approaches to the
record."

Ideology or interpretive
philosophy?
As previously noted, Table 3 shows
that even absent a pronounced ideological tilt, the eight liberaljustices
are more likely to rely on legislative
history than the five Rehnquist
Court conservatives. The liberals'
more favorable view toward this history is distinctive in both eras: liberal justices made use of legislative
history 21 percent more often than
conservative justices during the
Rehnquist years and 30 percent
more often during the Burger era.s0
Much of the difference for the
Rehnquist era reflects the arrival of
two conservative justices who are
implacably opposed to legislative
history reliance. Still, it remains
true as a general matter that liberal
justices are more inclined to value
legislative history than are their
conservative colleagues.
The difference in interpretive attitudes with regard to legislative hissuch reliance did have an ideological dimension
in limited circumstances. For close cases (decisions involving a vote margin of one or two
between majority and dissent), majority reliance
on legislative history was significantly more likely
to be associated with a liberal or pro-employee
result than for close decisions in which legislative
history was not part of the majority's explanation.
This finding may be primarily attributable to the
conduct of our eight liberal justices: they were
more likely to rely on legislative history in authoring close majorities with pro-employee results
than when authoring pro-employee decisions that
commanded wider vote margins. When the Court
is closely divided and issues a liberal decision, it is
perhaps not surprising that justices in the majority tend to be both liberal (favoring pro-employee
results generally) and heavier users of legislative
history (see Table 3 and accompanying discussion).
30. The Rehnquist Court differential is 39%
reliance for liberals and 18% for conservatives;
the Burger Court differential is 54% for liberals
and 24% for conservatives. The Burger Court
numbers for our group of conservative justices
include only 37 majority opinions: those authored
by Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor.

tory may well reflect a deeper fault
line involving judicial understandings about how best to acknowledge
the lawmaking supremacy of Congress. Although this separation of
powers debate is more complex than
can be adequately addressed here, a
few observations are in order.
Conservative federal judges in
recent decades have often been
skeptical whether legislative history
can be helpful in achieving fidelity to
congressionally enacted text. They
maintain that to be properly respectful of Congress's constitutional role
as a unified lawmaking body, judges
should avoid or minimize reliance
on the unenacted intentions
expressed by various congressional
subgroups. Liberal judges, on the
other hand, have tended to view

evidence is inevitably influenced by
her reaction to the ideological thrust
of the statutes themselves. 1 This
study's findings on the ideologically
neutral aspects of legislative history
reliance by liberal justices suggest
that the divergence in approach
between these two groups may warrant additional explanation. While
further study should continue to
address the possible ideological
dimensions of legislative history
reliance, the differences observed
between the Court's two wings over a
36-year period may reflect interpretive philosophy as well as ideological
strategy.

Concluding thoughts
This analysis of legislative history
reliance in Burger and Rehnquist

The Court's reliance on legislative
history turns out to be intriguingly
non-ideological in direction.
efforts to discern and apply the
intent of key legislative subgroups as
furthering their constitutional role
of junior partner in the lawmaking
enterprise. They assume that the
record of such intent can be evaluated in a suitably cautious manner,
and therefore that legislative history
constitutes relevant and probative
evidence of what Congress was seeking to accomplish.
Scholars in both law and social science have suggested that this differmust be
in
attitudes
ence
ideologically driven. Mindful of the
fact that most federal laws enacted
since the 1930s point in a liberal or
pro-regulatory direction, these scholars contend that ajudge's willingness
to draw on legislative background
31. See, e.g., Steven R. Greenberger, Civil Rights
and the Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 62 U.
CoLo. L. Rev. 37, 38-51 (1991); Stephen E Ross,
Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L.
REv. 399, 420-25 (1989);Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert
Cover, IdeologicalValues and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, 83 Am. POL. ScI. REv. 557, 562
(1989).

era majority opinions addresses a distinct subset of the Court's decision
docket. The focus on workplace law
covers only one-sixth of the Court's
caseload-a study of the Court's output in other substantive areas might
yield additional findings.
Further, this study examines how
legislative history and other resources
are used to justify the Court's decisions, not what actually accounts for a
majority author's judicial behavior.
Personal beliefs, policy preferences,
and strategic considerations surely
help shape the priority given to each
interpretive resource. It may be that
reliance on legislative history, like
reliance on Supreme Court precedent, promotes principled justifications for outcomes that the justices
are inclined to reach anyway. The
analyses presented here offer advantages in understanding the judicial
reasoning process, but do not purport to identify the extent to which a
justice's individual value judgments
influence that reasoning process.

This study does, however, shed
light on the relevance and magnitude of several different factors that
help explain the Court's patterns of
reliance on legislative history. It is
evident that Justice Scalia has played
an important role in the Court's
declining use of this resource-both
through high profile resistance and
criticism expressed in his own opinions, and through the influence he
seems to have had on the writings of
his colleagues.
Subject matter considerations also
have contributed to the Court's
growing reluctance to rely on the
legislative history resource. Sharp
declines in reliance have occurred
for statutes that aged notably during
the 36 years covered by the study. As
a regulatory scheme advances to
middle age or beyond, the Court
may well conclude that other interpretive resources are more trustworthy or malleable in clarifying and
developing the meaning of inconclusive text.
Finally, the Court's reliance on legislative history turns out to be
intriguingly non-ideological in direction. With respect to the Court as a
whole and distinctly ideological subgroups of justices, legislative history
reliance for liberal workplace law
statutes is associated with proemployer results more often than
one might expect. Several principled
explanations for these findings suggest that the Court's use of legislative
history may be deliberative and
coherent in ways that legislative history skeptics have not imagined. V,
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Books

Law versus science
and the problem
of eyewitness
identification
By Timothy S. Eckley
True Witness: Cops, Courts,
Science, and the Battle Against
Misidentification,by James M.
Doyle. Palgrave MacMillan. 2005.
223 pages. $24.95.
he haunting nature of Franz
Kaka 's The Trial lies in its everyman aspect: the main character "K."
inexplicably finds himself mired in the
vagaries of an unfathomable legal system
from which he cannot escape. Imagine,
however if it were not fiction. Imagine
you were one of the thousands of innocent
people imprisoned in the United States for
a crime you did not commit.
In March, 1985, ex-marine Kirk
Noble Bloodsworth was tried and
convicted for the brutal murder and
sexual assault of a nine-year-old girl
and sentenced to death by a jury of
his peers. He was law enforcement's
prime suspect; the prosecution had
its man. Five eyewitnesses testified at
trial that they had seen Bloodsworth
with the victim. After serving two
years on death row, his conviction
was overturned and he was retried,
convicted a second time, and sentenced to two consecutive life terms.
It was a crime he did not commit. It's
a crime that remains unsolved.
After serving nearly nine years in
prison as an innocent man, Bloodsworth was exonerated through DNA
testing in 1993 and was released from
230

gle of social scientists attempting to
effect fundamental changes in the
American criminal justice system by
conviction testing utilizing DNA scilaying bare the too-often cataentific advances. The details of Blood- strophic results of blind adherence
to and faith in fickle aspects of
sworth's story are far from unique.
According to the NorthwesternJour- human nature.
Doyle launches frequent broadnal of Criminal Law and Criminology
from 1989-2003 340 people were
sides at the justice system, and
exonerated in the United States. The
frankly universally indicts everyone
involved in the administration ofjusadvent of DNA technology and
improved forensic techniques has
tice-law enforcement, lawyers,
accelerated the rate of exonerations judges-as being "derisive" towards,
beyond everyone's expectations, con- "patronizing" of, "hostile" to, and
comitantly exposing alarming weak- "reflexively" dismissive of psychology
nesses in the American criminal
specifically, and all of science generjustice system.
ally. The oft-repeated criticism of the
court system as harboring an ongoDocumented exonerations in
America date at least as far back as ing "hostility" and "contempt"
1820. What may be surprising, how- towards science is overstated, but
ever, is that the oldest, most reliable,
that tone is consistent with the balmost relied upon form of identifying
ance of this fascinating nonfiction
a criminal suspect-eyewitness iden- work on the history of psychology
and the law, which reads like a novel.
tification-has been shown to
account for more wrongful convicDoyle begins with an entertaining
tions than all other factors com- redux of the turn of the 1 9 th century
bined. Frailties of human memory heavyweight bout over the role of
and perception have been at the
psychology in the courtroom fought
heart of debates about the criminal
by Hugo Munsterberg, the "father of
applied psychology," and Dean John
justice system in this country for
nearly 100 years. Only recently, how- Henry Wigmore, a towering legal
ever, in conjunction with the devel- scholar of the age. The story conopment of peer-reviewed, verifiable
cludes with Attorney General Janet
psychological science, has the legal Reno, an unsung but crucial hero in
system truly begun to acknowledge
the "law-versus-psychology battle,"
the prevalence of inaccurate eyewit- and Iowa State psychology professor
Gary Wells and his vision of how
ness identifications and to take steps
"psychology could play a role in
to prevent the inevitably tragic consequences.
improving the world," by improving
In True Witness, James Doyle pres- the accuracy and reliability of eyewitents fascinating insights into the
ness identifications and procedures.
world of high-stakes academia fight- Doyle reports that "each year an estiing to make a difference in mainmated 75,000 American prosecutions turn on eyewitness evidence."
stream America. More precisely,
Doyle weaves throughout a massive
Doyle traces the history of the strugprison five months after his mother
passed away. He was the first person
exonerated from death row by post
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amount of research the compelling
stories of death row exonerees and
the tribulations of heroic figures
committed to preventing such catastrophes in the future.

Challenging reliability
Hugo Munsterberg, Doyle notes, was
"alert enough to notice" that moral
issues in America "inexorably gravitate toward the courts." (p.1 5 ) Munsterberg published a series of essays,
ultimately collected in On the Witness
Stand, including a discourse titled
"The Memory of the Witness,"
wherein he challenged the reliability
of eyewitness accounts by relating his
own failed recollections in testimony
he gave during the trial of a suspected burglar of his own home.
Alarmed and intrigued by the contamination of his own prodigious
memory, Munsterberg set out to
demonstrate his self-revelations of
memory mistakes.
Munsterberg illustrated the relative
lack of correlation between a witness'
certainty in testifying to an event and
the accuracy of the testimony. He
demonstrated the phenomenon that
is becoming commonly known today
as "confirmatory bias," which includes
the theory that perception, memory,
and recall-the fundamental bases of
eyewitness testimony--are subject to
"suggestion, distortion, and omission,
[which] was very bad news for legal
procedure," according to Doyle. (p.
21) Doyle presents a fascinating rendition of a "mock trial" between Wigmore and Munsterberg on the law vs.
psychology debate and highlights the
crux of the matter: "The cross-examination of 'Muensterberg' revealed in
humbling fashion that when it came
to understanding which particular
witness produced a good, and which a
bad, verdict psychologists were, just
like lawyers, groping in the dark."
(p. 30)
Some 70 years later psychologist
Robert Buckhout noted the failure of
psychology to contribute significantly
to the prevention of faulty eyewitness
identification. By the same token, the
"Great Engine" of cross-examination-that most stalwart protector of
credibility in the courtroom-was like-

wise less than effective in preventing
false identifications and wrongful convictions. Buckhout, taking the fight
into the courtroom by way of expert
testimony, "attacked the videotape version of eyewitness memory at length,
explaining that memory was actually a
delicate three-stage process of perception, storage, and recall, which was
vulnerable at every stage.., including
the social pressures inherent in the
environment of a lineup.., to identify
a suspect in order to please authority
figures." (p. 56) Despite the misgivings of many that the work of Buckhout and his colleagues was creating a
dangerous weapon for the benefit of
all criminal defendants, most of whom
are truly guilty, "by increasing juror
skepticism about all eyewitnesses," the
eyewitness identification reform
movement had at least gained a toehold in the legal system.
Preventing misidentification
While the psychological experts were
indeed making inroads into the
courtroom the progress was slow and
the practical effect of their efforts
regarding eyewitness identification
was limited. Then along came Professor Gary Wells. If the legal system
was unable sufficiently to identify or
rectify errors in eyewitness testimony
after they had been made, Gary
Wells has been instrumental in developing methods of preventing mistaken identities from occurring in
the first place. His formula of "estimator variables" denominated factors the criminal justice system
cannot control, such as the race of
the
perpetrator, circumstances
under which the event occurred, the
length of the criminal event, and the
like, and "system variables," which
are factors under the direct control
of the justice system, such as the
form and method of witness interviews, suspect interrogations, and
identification procedures.
This
methodology enabled Wells to champion sequential, rather than simultaneous, line-ups and photo arrays.
By focusing on system variables,
Wells and his colleagues have been
able to posit additional practical
reforms in law enforcement's inter-

rogation and investigation procedures that garner significantly fewer
misidentifications with only a marginal drop in positive identifications.
In 1997, a working group assembled
by Wells recommended to the criminal justice system four peer-reviewed,
"best practices:"
1. Double-blind testing. The person supervising the identification
procedure should be unaware of
who the suspected perpetrator is in
order to avoid contaminating the witness' independent and objective
memory.
2. Improving instructions to witnesses.
Witnesses
should
be
instructed that the suspected criminal perpetrator "may, or may not, be"
in the line-up to reduce the number
of "false hits."
3. Selecting better "fillers," by
matching the witness' description of
the criminal, not law enforcement's
early suspect.
4. Gauging eyewitness confidence
immediately before the influence of
post-identification feedback. (pp.
164-65)
Advancing deliberately
The United States justice system suffers a beating at the hands of James
Doyle. Introspective systems of justice, such as ours, do tend to move
more slowly than one might wish,
especially in an era of rapid scientific
advancement. Often, however, it
advances quite deliberately with
good reason. The courts have readily
embraced DNA technology, as they
have many, many other revolutionary
scientific advancements.
When confronted with novel scientific evidence or theories, the
judge's role of gatekeeper of the
courtroom and guardian of the jury
must be played deliberately. As the
then Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted in 1923 'just
when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable
stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must
be recognized . . . ." Frye v. United
States, 293 E 1013, 1014 (1923). Writwww.ajs.org JUDICATURE
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ing more recently for the United
States Supreme Court in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993),Justice Harry Blackmun observed the "important differences between the quest for truth in
the courtroom and the quest for
truth in the laboratory. Scientific
conclusions are subject to perpetual
revision. Law, on the other hand,
must resolve disputes finally and
quickly." The struggle is great for
many reasons, including that it
threatens the traditional province of
the jury of determining matters of
credibility and the weight of evidence, of which it is the role of the
presiding judge to protect. Even
Doyle acknowledges that "The science will not stay frozen forever. Will
further research prove that sequential lineups are really no better than
simultaneous ones?" (p. 205)
As Doyle iterates, some reluctance
to accepting new scientific eyewitness
identification techniques stems from
the fear that guilty defendants, and
defense lawyers charged with representing them, would use the mountains of information and scientific
studies to cast skepticism on all eye-

witness testimony no matter how
irrefutable it might otherwise be. If
the standard of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt, and the crucial evidence is eyewitness identification,
and any particular eyewitness identification is shown to be the product of
procedure inconsistent with cutting
edge standards and is thus inherently
unreliable-the result is a dangerous
indictment of the entire criminal justice system. "The prosecutors thought
[Wells] was handing defense lawyers a
new weapon with which to beat the
cops over the head." (p. 173)

High stakes
The stakes involved with wrongful
convictions could not be higher. And
perhaps the justice system has
blindly or stubbornly held too long
to the notion of eyewitness infallibility. In this light, Doyle, the psychological researchers, and others are
justly impatient and frustrated with
the pace of reform. While Munsterberg may have begun this struggle
nearly 100 years ago, it is really relatively recently that the pioneering
work of Gary Wells and others has
been done. And even so, if not for

the advent of DNA technology, psychology and overdue reform in eyewitness identification procedures
would still be relegated to and subject to the vagaries of trench warfare
in the courtroom governed by a legal
system of rules and procedures that
by design is anathema to affirmatively imposing wholesale reform
beyond its own hallowed halls.
The courts, constrained by precedent, are charged with and accustomed to acting as referees, not
players, in the game of law enforcement. Although they should not sit
passively in light of the recent developments in forensic eyewitness identification, they are not well suited to
effect systemic changes of this
nature. True Witness should serve as a
wake-up call for all stakeholders in
the administration of justice to recognize that only through broad
cooperation can meaningful systemwide change be accomplished. vz;
TIMOTHY S. ECKLEY
is a staff attorney/publications
associate at the American Judicature
Society. (teckley@ajs.org)
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Revolutionary
changes
by Sally J. Kenney
Building the UK's New Supreme
Court: National and Comparative
Perspectives, edited by Andrew Le
Sueur. Oxford University Press.
2004. 376 pages. $90.

F

r a system that revels in tradition,

makes only the smallest incremental changes, and thinks modernizing
is a dirty word, the changes in the
judiciaries of the United Kingdom in
the last 10 years have been nothing
short of revolutionary. Devolving powers to Scotland, Northern Ireland
(where the Assembly is currently suspended), and to a lesser extent,
Wales, has made those jurisdictions
the vanguard of electing women legislators, instituting judicial nominating
232

commissions, and attempting to operationalize the concept of a representative judiciary.
Clearly on the agenda for a new
supreme court in the United Kingdom is the constitutional issue of
determining the relationship of the
parts to the whole. How will Scotland's independent civil law system
fit into a system of appeals, formerly
the purview of the Privy Council?
Should a judge from Northern Ireland have a guaranteed seat on the
House of Lords? Passage of the
Human Rights Act of 1998 has
brought into sharper focus the relationship with the U.K. as part of
international and supranational
institutions and the judicial systems
they created, the Council of Europe
(European Court of Human Rights)
and European Union (European
Court ofJustice), respectively.
Many of us who advocate for
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reform, such as modernizing the
arcane (and discriminatory) system
of selecting judges, utilizing judicial
staff more effectively, curtailing
unlimited oral argument, and developing control over the appellate
docket hope that the debate engendered by the passage of the Human
Rights Act and more recently in 2003
the abolition of the office of the
Lord Chancellor will place some of
these other reform issues squarely on
the public's agenda.
Into this milieu steps Professor
Andrew Le Sueur and his co-authors.
Building the UK's New Supreme Court:
National and Comparative Perspectives
offers lesson-learning from the highest constitutional courts in the
United States, Canada, Germany,
and Spain as well as the European
Court ofJustice and European Court
of Human Rights. The project on
which this book is based (the Consti-

tution Unit) started in 1999 and this
volume includes the papers presented at two seminars in 2001. They
are relevant to the current debate
but, as they preceded it, do not
engage it directly.

What are the lessons?
Who is the audience for this text, I
wondered repeatedly as I read each
chapter. High-level civil servants considering models of reform? The
higher judiciary itself? Scholars such
as myself specializing in judicial
selection and the U.K.'s legal systems
more generally? Or scholars and students of comparative law? Even the
most devoted in each group will find
it tough going reading from cover to
cover. Do we really need to know the
history of Scottish law from several
centuries past to figure out the route
of appeal of a new supreme court?
I'm not sure Scottish highlanders are
really comparable to native peoples
of Canada, or those in Northern Ireland to the Quebequois, but I'm willing to be persuaded of the relevance
of the comparative example. Alas,
like too many volumes of so-called
work, comparison
comparative
means considering a country other
than the dominant, in this case, the

United Kingdom. So we have interesting articles about Spain, Germany,
Canada, and the United States, but
the chapters leave all lesson drawing
to the reader.
Several of the articles also have a
second flaw of much comparative
work: the authors are overly smitten
by their own countries marvelous success in solving problems, in this volume, from federalism to managing
their caseloads. Happily, we have a
less sanguine view from Canada. If
policy makers are going to borrow
from one another, they need accurate, even critical, assessments of policy as implemented, not the
propagandist's. Likewise, English
judges and defenders of the English
legal profession need to broaden
their perspective from the untested
and uncritical assumption of "the best
in the world" to consider the lessons
of other jurisdictions. Several of the
fine essays in the volume, such as Le
Sueur's ("Choosing Cases"), Kate
Malleson's ('judicial Appointments
in the Era of Human Rights and
Devolution"), and Richard Gordon's
("Relationships between Bench and
Bar") encourage them to do just that.
Judicaturereaders who are not academics might be interested in a

chapter or two on a relevant topic. I
learned something interesting and
important from each chapter,
although if I had not been a reviewer
I probably would have skipped over
more than half. Those who are
teaching about the U.K.'s legal systems have a relevant (if somewhat
dry, and descriptive rather than analytical) compilation that will serve
them well. Other teachers of comparative law will simply have to compare the individual chapters to what
they already have on the jurisdiction
in question. The essays are relevant
and competent, but I am not in a
position to say that the chapter on
Spain, for example, is the best
overview in English.
Despite these criticisms, I look forward to further work by the team at
the Constitution Unit. v

SALLY J. KENNEY
is a professor of public affairs and law
and director of the Center on Women
and Public Policy at the University of
Minnesota. (skenney@hhh.umn.edu)
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What passes for
justice
by Mary T. Skerrett
Courtroom 302: A Year Behind the
Scenes in an American Criminal
Courthouse, by Steve Bogira.
Alfred A. Knopf. 2005. 416 pages.
$25

F

orget everything you ever learned
in school about the criminal justice system. Steve Bogira will tell you
what really goes on in America's
courtrooms and how little it has to
do with justice. From his unique perspective as an observer in the Cook
County (Illinois) Criminal Courthouse, he lets us in on the daily
wheeling and dealing that passes for
justice in Courtroom 302: A Year

Behind the Scenes in an American Criminal Courthouse.From the moment of
arrest until final determination, we
follow the poor and powerless
through a system that seeks not justice, but expediency. Courtroom 302
shows what has become typical in
Chicago's courtrooms and is about
"how justice miscarries every day, by
doing precisely what we ask it to do."
Steve Bogira is a prize-winning
writer for The Chicago Reader This
book is the result of a project fellowship the author was awarded in 1993
to report on urban criminal courts
and the poor. Bogira spent the calendar year of 1998 in the courtroom
of Judge Daniel Locallo observing
criminal court procedure, poring
over police reports and judicial decisions, and interviewing everyone
involved in the process. He gives us

insight into the decision-making
processes of the power players-the
judge, the prosecutors and public
defenders; he also lets us in on discussions he had with those not in the
limelight such as Chicago police officers, bailiffs, court clerks, and court
reporters. However, the most interesting and enlightening stories come
from his intimate conversations with
defendants, defendants' families, witnesses, victims, and victims' families-the masses that converge on
the courthouse every day with little
voice or influence over the paths
their lives will take after spending
time in Courtroom 302.
The courtroom background is a
noisy, chaotic, confused world in
which alleged offenders are herded
through the system as if cattle in a
stockyard. The immediate goal is
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